THE DOUBLE‐EDGED SWORD OF INTERDICT:
SOME MORE WARNINGS FROM HISTORY

Marshall Crossnoe

I would like to begin with a claim that I have heard or read in one form or another for almost
thirty years. The claim is this: “Church history teaches that whenever Christian thinkers baptize
philosophy, they compromise the Christian faith.” That claim is the church historian’s version of
St. Paul’s warning, “see to it that no one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive
philosophy.” It is the church historian’s answer to Tertullian’s famous rhetorical question, “What
does Jerusalem have to do with Athens?” It is a “history of doctrine take” on the perennial
conflict between faith and reason, a take that Adolph Harnack exploited to great and lasting effect
in History of Doctrine, and the one that Etienne Gilson challenged in his famous little book
entitled Faith and Reason.
The claim reminds me of interdict. Interdict is the censure that bishops of Rome have
been using since the ninth century.1 By means of interdict, popes interrupt participation in holy
things. It typically takes the form of denying someone or some group access to the Divine
Liturgy, the sacraments, Christian burial, or other means of grace. The claim regarding what
church history teaches is a call to interdict philosophy. If church history teaches that whenever
Christian thinkers baptize philosophy, they compromise the Christian faith, then we should have
nothing to do with philosophy. We should withhold baptism from it.
I do not believe that is a good idea. T he interdiction of philosophy is a double-edged
sword. It can, and in the past it has, cut both ways. We can protect theological investigation from
contamination or compromise by prohibiting the use of philosophical tools of enquiry in
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theological investigation. But such prohibition can also insulate theological investigation from
constructive and creative engagement.
I. Paris in the Thirteenth Century
An instructive instance of such constructive and creative engagement occurred at the University
of Paris during the thirteenth century. Several generations of academic theologians directed a
bright season of theological and philosophical interplay, one in which philosophy served holy
doctrine (sacra doctrina). Furthermore, during that same bright season others were busy trying to
quarantine the faith from philosophical contamination. Between approximately 1190 and 1330, a
handful of Parisian masters put Aristotle to work productively as a handmaiden to theology just
when others sought to place Aristotle under interdict. The convergence of both treatments of
philosophy by theology has something to teach us.
A. Philosophy Baptized
Three related trajectories of theological and philosophical interplay animated the arts and
theology faculties at Paris during the thirteenth century.2 Alexander of Hales (g c. 1245) led the
first of the trajectories. In his theological Summa, which was compiled before 1245, Alexander
posed the question, “Is theology a science?” He was probably the first academic theologian to ask
that question, and he answered it in the negative. “Theology is not a science,” Alexander wrote.
“It is a ‘wisdom.’” It is a habit or virtue of knowledge, and it is different from the habit or virtue
of knowledge called science. Alexander and his contemporaries had received a particular
understanding of science (scientia) from Aristotle and Boethius, and understanding that assumes
science is the apprehension and articulation of universal truths by means of demonstration. By
contrast, according to Alexander, Holy Doctrine seeks salvation, and it does so by apprehension
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and articulation of revealed truths and particular, historical truths. The means and ends of these
two ways of knowing are different. Because the revealed and historical truths that theology treats
are alluded to or found in Holy Scripture, the primary method of theology is not demonstration.
Instead, theology employs the methods of textual analysis. As Alexander saw it, treat metaphors
and imagery; they trace narratives, and use other strategies that are essentially literary.
At about the same time, other Parisian theologians were pursuing a related, but slightly
different line of enquiry. This second trajectory eventually moved the discussion about whether or
not theology was a science to another level. William of Auxerre (g 1223) initiated the second
trajectory by thinking like one of Alexander’s theologians, that is, by proposing an analogy. In his
Sentences commentary, which might be the earliest Sentences commentary ever produced,
William suggested that the articles of the Christian faith function in theology just as first
principles function in philosophy. He was probably the first to propose this analogy. Where
Alexander and his followers answered, “No, theology is not a science; it is something completely
different,” William and his followers answered, “Yes, there is one way we can consider theology
to be a science, and that is by taking ‘science’ to mean the way of thinking that moves from first
principles to conclusions by accepted rational means.”
Thomas Aquinas (g 1274) is the best-known theologian who embraced William of
Auxerre’s analogy. Aquinas exploited the full explanatory power of the analogy, and in doing so
advanced understanding of the process of theological thinking. He acknowledged the necessity of
revelation and its operation in theological thinking, which was a standard approach that went all
the way back to Augustine. For Aquinas as for Augustine, the articles of the Christian faith are
revealed, and they correspond to a “revelatory receptivity” in human beings. As revealed, these
articles become the first principles of the faith. But Aquinas advanced the discussion by
suggesting that this mode of knowing makes room for questions. He combined Augustine’s view
of revealed knowledge with William of Auxerre’s analogy to science and produced a compelling
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definition and justification of the Parisian theological project. Because revealed articles of the
faith could be reasoned from like first principles, active reflection on collections of articles of the
faith such as Peter Lombard’s Sentences could generate further truths, derivative truths, new
truths. And so students of theology in universities across Europe composed commentaries on
Lombard’s Sentences for the next 500 years.
The conception of science as a body of truths or conclusions derived from first principles
by means of demonstration is a philosophical conception. Alexander of Hales and company said
that theology is not ordered according to that conception, but William of Auxerre and Thomas
Aquinas and others said it is. The operative difference is that members of the second group
believed theology and philosophy started from different principles, and that they ended at
different propositions. Summas, Sentences commentaries, and collections of quodlibetal and other
disputed questions produced around 1250 reveal Parisian theologians sorting out the vagaries and
contradictions attendant on the claim that theology is a way of knowing that is similar in some
important ways to the philosophical way of knowing called science.
A third and related trajectory also opened up at mid-century. Contemporaries of the
younger Aquinas, or perhaps a few theologians who immediately preceded him, began to ask the
next logical question. Some of those who accepted the analogy between theological knowing and
the knowing of science accepted the related distinction between types of knowing, and then
explored the distinction’s implications for theology. Summas, Sentences commentaries, and
collections of questions produced at Paris between 1250 and 1330 contain the question, “What
kind of science is theology?” And the answers they give to this question are philosophical
answers.
The range of possible answers to the question “What kind of science is theology?” was
never very wide. The number of possible answers was limited from the very beginning, and it was
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limited for philosophical reasons. Theology was either speculative or practical. The ancient Greek
division of knowledge into theory and praxis ruled the thirteenth-century investigations. Masters
and scholars at Paris during the third and fourth quarters of the century opted for one or the other
of the two positions. Some answered that theology is a speculative science, because its highest
occupation is contemplation of God alone. It seeks no other object but knowledge of the divine.
Others argued that theology is practical, because its end is practice. It is an intellectual habit
intended to change the theologian’s behavior. Thomas Aquinas is the leading figure of a group
who sought a middle position by answering that theology is both speculative and practical. Of
course, Aquinas leaned to the speculative side; he wrote that theology as speculative is the more
noble endeavor, for as such it is concerned with divine truth.
The ancient philosophical division of knowledge helped thirteenth-century theologians at
Paris to understand their own academic discipline, and their use of that division opened up new
possibilities. Franciscan theology masters following Bonaventure (g 1274) offered a third
answer, one that bypassed the dominant binary of theory and praxis. They argued that theology is
neither speculative nor practical, but affective. It is a way of knowing that transforms the desires,
that restructures and redirects the affective life of human beings. I am working on a manuscript of
a Victorine master from the early fourteenth century who posed the question this way: “Is
theology speculative, practical, or affective?” He answered that it is speculative, but his
articulation of the question and his summary treatment of all three possible answers are
instructive. They testify to the way in which the original binary approach to the question, which
was thoroughly philosophical, opened up a third option that produced theological insight.
B. Philosophy Interdicted
At the same time that academic theologians were following these three fruitful trajectories of
philosophical theologizing, others at Paris were attempting to interdict philosophy. In 1210, a
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church council forbade the public or private reading of Aristotle’s natural philosophy and
commentaries on it.3 In 1215, papal legate Robert de Courçon issued a series of statutes for the
University of Paris that renewed the earlier prohibition.4 The statutes specified the minimum age
and training requirements for university masters. They also specified the style and color of robes
that masters could wear when teaching, and they prohibited masters from wearing fancy shoes
under their robes. More important for our concerns, the 1215 statutes directly addressed the issue
of teaching philosophy. They specified a list of treatises on logic by Porphyry, Aristotle, and
Boethius that could be taught by members of the arts faculty. Only senior regent masters could
teach these texts, and only during what were called “regular lectures.” Non-regents and advanced
students were not allowed to lecture on the logical treatises in the informal afternoon sessions
called “extraordinary lectures.” Moreover, the regents could only teach the logical works. The
Metaphysics and the treatises on natural philosophy were explicitly proscribed. They were not to
be taught or read, and anyone found doing so had fifteen days to publicly and permanently correct
his ways. If he did not, excommunication procedures were started. Aristotle’s metaphysics and
natural philosophy were effectively placed under interdict.
The story did not end in 1215. Perhaps as few as two decades later, university masters at
Paris were lecturing on the very works of Aristotle that the 1215 statutes prohibited. We have
known for some time that the statutes did not regulate university practice for very long. Another
document issued in 1255 makes that clear.5 Evidently, at some point after 1215, Courçon’s
statutes were either officially rescinded, or they were unofficially ignored. The 1255 document
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lists the texts that were taught in the arts and philosophy faculties, and Aristotle’s Metaphysics
and Physics, and other works of natural philosophy are on the list. A number of scholars around
the world are currently working on this development, and they have made some interesting
discoveries. They are filling in the gaps between 1215 and 1255. We now know, for example, that
an anonymous master in the arts faculty lectured on Aristotle’s Concerning the Soul at Paris
during the mid 1240s.6 Rega Wood is single-handedly rewriting the history of natural philosophy
at Paris, arguing from strong manuscript evidence that masters were lecturing on Aristotle’s
Physics by 1231.7
What accounts for this change? Was the 1210/1215 interdiction of Aristotle officially
lifted? If so, why? The jury is still out on these questions, and several possible answers are being
debated. Comparing the 1210 prohibition and the 1215 statutes, scholars have noted that the latter
tacitly permitted private reading of the works that had been prohibited. A papal decree of 1231
allowed the prohibited works to be corrected by a committee of scholars.8 So there was
movement, but a full and compelling explanation of the movement is still pending. It will
doubtless include the fact that a new generation of masters and students was at work during the
1230s, a new generation of younger theologians who had better access to and thus better
understanding of Aristotle. All of Aristotle’s works were recovered and reconstructed by midcentury, so more of Aristotle’s writings were available in more complete and more accurate
editions than ever before. That means the younger theologians were in a position to understand
Aristotle better than their predecessors. The fact that they moved beyond the earlier prohibitions
and statutes makes sense in that context.
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Others reasserted prohibitions of philosophy near the end of the thirteenth century. In
1270, the bishop of Paris Etienne Tempier published a condemnation of thirteen radical
Aristotelian teachings attributed to Averroes (g 1198). Seven years later, in 1277, he published a
list of 219 propositions that were not to be taught at the university, under the same possible
penalties as in 1210/1215.9 Most of the 219 prohibited propositions, or “errors” as they were
called, were claims about natural philosophy taken from Aristotle. Teaching about the eternality
of the world, the unicity of the intellect, the possibility of rectilinear motion in space, and other
philosophical ideas were prohibited on pain of excommunication.
The story of the 1277 prohibitions is well known, and one assessment of its effects is
famous and controversial, at least among historians of medieval science. Pierre Duhem argued
that the masters at Paris who were prohibited from teaching Aristotle entertained other
explanations of natural and physical phenomena, and thus were precursors of the Scientific
Revolution.10 Duhem celebrated those early fourteenth-century masters who could no longer
teach what Aristotle taught about the movement of bodies in space, and the space that they moved
in, because of the prohibitions. Instead, they began to entertain possibilities of rectilinear motion
and empty space, possibilities that paved the way for modern physics and astronomy.
This “Duhem thesis” has been roundly debated, and most now agree that it was
exaggerated.11 It is too much of an historical stretch to claim that the prohibitions contributed
directly to the rise of modern science, no matter how sweet one finds the irony. But the 1277
prohibitions did motivate new philosophical speculation. The manuscript record is unequivocal
on that point. Bishop Tempier’s attempt to interdict philosophy provoked further philosophizing,
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and some of the new ideas generated by that further philosophizing were picked up later and
developed in the modern conception of a mechanistic universe governed by natural laws. And, we
should hasten to add, the 1277 prohibitions were annulled in the fourteenth century.
II. Warnings from Church History and a Possible Application
Academic theology at Paris during the thirteenth century has some warnings for us. It warns that
efforts at interdicting philosophy are not always effective in the long term. Members of the next
and smarter generation tend to ignore such efforts. Also, attempts at interdicting philosophy often
provoke unanticipated consequences. They motivate further philosophizing, which can create
conditions more dire than the original conditions that motivated the interdiction in the first place.
These warnings suggest a contemporary example with which I shall close. Anglicans
have historically recognized three sources of authority for Christian faith and practice: the Holy
Scriptures, Christian tradition, and human reason. In a way that resonates with the aspirations and
achievements of the thirteenth-century theologians, the early Anglican theologians chose to not
interdict philosophy. Unlike the continental reformers who cried “sola scriptura,” and unlike
their Roman counterparts who relied too optimistically on tradition, the Anglicans included the
human intellect as a third and mitigating determinant of faith. They insisted that reasoning
operates in living dialectic with the Holy Scriptures and tradition as a gift and guide to the
faithful. They affirmed a careful trust in human rationality as a resource for better understanding
and articulating their faith.
Beginning in the late 1960s and continuing until his death in 2004, Jacques Derrida
pursued and perfected a philosophical critique of writing that decentered the “presence,” the
source, the objective referentiality of written language.12 Derrida’s philosophical critique
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undermines textual authority, an outcome that would naturally be threatening to an Anglican who
affirms the authority of Scripture. But perhaps that same Anglican should not rush to interdict
deconstruction. Maybe he or she should instead join others who are engaging deconstruction’s
philosophical challenge to textual authority.
The thirteenth-century theologians we have considered might be helpful in such
engagement, for Derrida, like Aristotle, might offer some philosophical assistance for our
theologizing. Engagement with deconstruction might lead one to conclude with Alexander of
Hales that, “No, this is not an acceptable approach to the textual authority of the Holy
Scriptures.” But continued conversation with deconstructionists in the effort to construct an
adequate and compelling account of how texts function as authoritative could lead elsewhere.
Scholars have been engaging deconstruction and its import for Biblical criticism in particular, and
for Christian faith in general, for some time.13 As William of Auxerre showed, a fruitful analogy
to some dimension of deconstruction might yet arise out of the engagement. Or, as in the case of
the thirteenth-century debates about what kind of science theology is, further conversation might
generate a creative way to surpass the binaries of deconstruction. I think of the binaries of the
present and the absent, or of the important and the apparently secondary. Derrida asserted that the
essential nature of written language demands the inversion of the important and secondary, but
engaging that inversion could cause a third way to open up just as continued engagement with
Aristotle and the broader philosophical tradition cause affective theology to open up as a
possibility at the end of the thirteenth century.
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I’ll stop. You catch my drift. Interdiction of deconstruction would make such potentially
fruitful conversation very difficult.
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